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que  les autorités ont manipulé  l’information disponible de manière à présenter  la 
politique  actuelle  de  lutte  contre  la  drogue  comme  un  succès.  Une  vue  étroite 
faisant  la  part  belle  aux  réussites  tactiques  a  ainsi  fait  obstacle  à  l’apprentissage 




crate continue de donner  la priorité au renforcement de  l’arsenal  législatif et à  la 
lutte contre l’approvisionnement en vue de réduire la consommation de drogue.
Mots-clés :  administration Obama,  apprentissage,  bureaucratie politique,  échec,  lutte 
contre la drogue, États-Unis.
THE WAR ON DRUGS ADDICTION 
the role of misinformation 
in the persistence of u.s. drug policy





In June 1971, President Richard Nixon addressed Congress and announced 
a new strategy to ight drug consumption, which still dominates U.S. poli-
tics—the war on drugs (Nixon, 1971; Baum, 1996, p.62). Four decades later, 
the Global Commission on Drug Policy (GCDP, 2011) published a report 
evaluating the war on drugs and its efect on drug use in the world. Right 
at its irst paragraph, the report presents a startling statement: “The global 
war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and 
societies around the world […] fundamental reforms in national and global 
drug control policies are urgently needed” (GCDP, 2011, p.2). 
Equally striking is the pre-eminence of political igures who support the 
diagnosis of the GCDP: former heads of state César Gaviria (Colombia), Ernesto 
Zedillo (Mexico), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazil), Ricardo Lagos (Chile), 
Jorge Sampaio (Portugal), George Papandreou (Greece), Aleksander Kwasniewski 
(Poland) and Ruth Dreifuss (Switzerland); United Nations’ (UN) key igures, 
such as former Secretary General Koi Annan, former High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Louise Arbour, former High Commissioner for Refugees 
Thorvald Stoltenberg; and U.S. leaders such as former Secretary of State George 
Shultz, former Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, and former Federal 
Reserve Board Chairmen Paul Volker (GCDP, 2014). In addition, U.S. Presidents 
Carter and Clinton openly recognised the failure of the war on drugs1.
Drug war failure has not resulted in learning
Rational policymaking expects state oicials to learn from policy mistakes 
(Levy, 1994, p.279; Stein, 1994, p.156, p.172). As Thomas Birkland (2006, p.8-9; 
1997, p.138) airms, policy failure may lead political actors to identify laws and 
create new solutions, generating new information in the political system. Facing 
this new data, policy-makers may learn with it and eliminate, adjust or replace 
a defective measure. Hence, policy failure might result in learning and change2.





It is necessary to notice, however, that learning the “right lesson” and 
even learning at all are only possibilities open to political judgement. Policy-
makers might just as well learn the “wrong lesson” by misinterpreting data, or 
ignore learning for some political/bureaucratic/economic interest, or persist 
on failure in the hope of long-term positive results, or simply be unable to 
identify the failure (Knopf, 2012, p.85; Levy, 1994, p.290). Notwithstanding, as 
long as a policy fails to attain the desired results, the potential for learning and 
the need for change will always be present, making it necessary to explain why 
learning and change are not happening.
Bearing this in mind, if U.S. anti-drug policies are such a failure, why is 
it that “most policymaking bodies at the national and international level have 
tended to avoid open scrutiny or debate on alternatives” (GCDP, 2011, p.4)? 
Equally, why is the Oice of National Drug Control Strategy legally prohibited 
of even considering any deviation from the current strategy, and why doesn’t 
any sitting politician in Washington openly support the termination of the war 
on drugs (Scherlen, 2012, p.71)? In sum, “why does the United States continue 
to pursue failed policies from the past decades as if U.S. policy-makers were 
unable to learn?” (Loveman, 2006, p.xiv).
To answer these questions, it is necessary to identify what exactly “lear-
ning” means. As Birkland (2006, p.8-9) asserts, political action is greatly moti-
vated by beliefs. By its turn, “experiential learning” is a “change of beliefs 
[…] or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the 
observation and interpretation of experience” (Levy, 1994, p.283). However, 
even if political actors learn and change their beliefs on a failed policy, it will 
not necessarily result in policy change (Knopf, 2012, p.85; Levy, 1994, p.290). 
For that to happen, it is necessary that policy-makers successfully institutiona-
lise learning into organisational procedures—a process that Levy (1994, p.287) 
calls “organisational” or “governmental learning”. 
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Thus, contrary to “experiential learning”, “governmental learning” requires 
policy change to take place—otherwise, learning is simply ignored and even-
tually forgotten (Knopf, 2012, p.87; Levy, 1994, p.287-9). As Levy (1994, p.288) 
explains, policy-makers might try to institutionalise learning and fail due to 
political, economic, or bureaucratic constraints.
In sum, considering that this paper seeks to expose the role of misinfor-
mation in blocking change in U.S. drug policy, it understands learning in its 
“organisational” or “governmental”, rather than simply “experiential” sense. 
It wishes to make an empirical contribution to the understanding of why and 
how failure is not resulting in a debate in Washington to redesign or replace 
the current defective approach to control drug use.
Defining learning in drug policy
When one talks about policy success or failure, it is important to distinguish 
two aspects: strategy and tactics. The former refers to the inal goal of a policy, and 
the means to achieve it. The latter refers to the intermediary goals and means of a 
policy, which in the long run should result in the achievement of the strategic goal3. 
Having said that, it is important to emphasise that the failure of the war on 
drugs is both strategic and tactical: as a strategy, prohibition has failed to signi-
icantly reduce drug consumption; tactically, the focus on supply reduction and 
law enforcement has proved to be extremely ineicient in undermining the drug 
market4. Still, the U.S. Government remains strongly attached to these methods.
Therefore, this article assumes that governmental learning in the war on 
drugs would be achieved once the U.S. executive and legislative branches openly 
recognized the failure of these strategic and tactical methods, because that is 
the elementary condition to make change possible. It would thus constitute a 
“change of beliefs” in Washington concerning the eiciency of prohibition, 
law enforcement and supply reduction. This change of ideas would result in a 




drug laws and the establishment of a new strategy and alternative tactics to 
reduce drugs’ harms to society. Anything under the opening of a public debate 
with clearly identiied alternatives would not qualify as learning.
Eliminating simple explanations
One could try to explain the absence of learning and change in the war on 
drugs based on apparently obvious reasons. In the irst place, one could argue 
that U.S. drug control agencies do not recognise the failure of prohibitionist 
and supply reduction policies. However, the fact that the U.S. Department of 
Justice states in its reports that overall drug consumption and availability are 
rising in the Country suggests that drug agencies are aware of the shortco-
mings of the war on drugs, and deliberately chose to frame it as an overall 
success in oicial documents (NDIC, 2011).
Moreover, it could be argued that the prohibitionist approach persists because 
there are no options to replace it. However, as Duane C. McBride et al. (2009, p.74-75) 
describes, there are at least four—not mutually exclusive—drug control approaches 
alternative to prohibition: 1) the harm reduction approach, which emphasises 
preventive education and health treatment; 2) medicalization, which defends that 
drug abuse should be managed by physicians, and not law enforcement; 3) legali-
sation and regulation, which supports governmental control and taxation over the 
production and distribution of drugs; and 4) decriminalisation, which calls for the 
end of judicial punishment to deter individuals to consume drugs.
 Then, one could argue that prohibition persists because the U.S. 
government evaluates other alternatives as less eicient than the current one. 
However, the fact that no sitting politician in Washington defends the termi-
nation of the war on drugs (Scherlen, 2012, p.71)—while others who left oice 
openly support it, suggests that there must be political constraints for sitting 
decision-makers to support policy deviation. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
there is not even a debate in the U.S. legislative and executive branches on the 
validity of the status quo and on the potential efects of changing it. 
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Furthermore, it is important to observe that the Oice of National Drug 
Control Strategy is forbidden from even considering the end of prohibition 
(Scherlen, 2012, p.71) and most U.S. policymaking bodies have avoided scru-
tiny on the subject (GCDP, 2011, p.4). These facts suggest that oicial institu-
tions are not carrying out substantial research on the harms of prohibition and 
the possible efects of alternative approaches.
The unexplored field of policy persistence
There is a vast literature on U.S. drug policy and the war on drugs: authors 
such as Musto (1999 [1973]), Baum (1996), Massing (1998) and Inciardi (2008) 
document the history of U.S. drug policy since the 19th century; Loveman (2006), 
Youngers and Rosin (2005) and Thoumi (2012) focus the international war on 
drugs, and how it has severely damaged societies where narcowars have been 
waged; Miron (2004) and Gray (1998) try to demonstrate that the war on drugs is 
a failure, and explain why it has not worked; lastly, Schlosser (2003), Husak (2002), 
Mares (2006) and Jenner (2011) emphasise the damage caused by the prohibitio-
nist approach to U.S. citizens, and even propose alternative models to replace it.
Notwithstanding, academics have not produced signiicant research on the 
reasons for the persistence of the war on drugs in spite of its failure and social 
harms. As a matter of fact, not only regarding the war on drugs, little research 
has been carried out to explain why policies tend to be hard to terminate, 
independently of success or failure (Geva-May, 2004, p.311; Bauer, 2009, p.2; 
Adam et al., 2007, p.221; Frantz, 1992, p.175). 
This research identiied only one article entirely dedicated to expose the 
reasons for the persistence of U.S. drug policy in spite of failure: Scherlen (2012) 
tries to explain the war on drugs continuity based on Policy Termination 
Theory and Prospect Theory, giving very important insights in understanding 
the phenomenon. However, his article is short; it covers a wide range of factors 
that make drug policy change di cult, but it does not give much detail on 
them. Due to such constrictions, when Scherlen (2012, p.67-68) describes the 
results of the war on drugs he oversimpliies them, giving the impression that 
they constitute an absolute failure with no achievements to be claimed. Hence, 
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his article ignores the fact that some degree of tactical success has been achie-
ved in the eforts to reduce drug supplies. 
By overlooking these achievements, a relevant factor blocking learning and 
change in drug policy is missed: the manner in which policy-makers have been 
led to believe that the war on drugs should continue. In other words, the charac-
terisation of the war on drugs as an absolute failure ignores the tactical achieve-
ments that oicials have used as evidence to support the argument that the war 
on drugs is a success and should continue. This paper seeks to explore this point.
In conclusion, research on the reasons for the persistence of the war on 
drugs and the role of misinformation in this process are missing pieces that 
ought to be introduced into drug policy literature. There is no doubt about the 
importance of research in this area: irst, it is an empirical contribution to theo-
ries of policy termination, as it would contribute to the scholarly understanding 
of why policies tend to persist in spite of failure, and what kind of forces make 
policy change hard to achieve; second, it is an empirical addition to the study 
of bureaucratic politics and self-serving bureaucracies, which has been largely 
overlooked in the U.S. drug policy literature5; third, it is an empirical contribu-
tion to the growing literature on whether or not the Obama administration has 
promoted a substantial change in the U.S. national security approach in general, 
and in U.S. drug policy in particular6; inally, it is policy relevant, as shedding 
light on how state oicials have made it possible to continue and escalate the 
war on drugs through a selective release of information can help activists and 
policy-makers to ind ways to open the debate and promote change.
Case studies
To analyse the manner in which U.S. oicials frame the war on drugs as 
a success, this article examines the cases of anti-drug programmes sponsored 
by Washington in Colombia and Mexico: the Plan Colombia and the Mérida 





tors of U.S. aid for the drug war efort in Latin America (U.S. Department of 
State, 2013). The representativeness of Mexico and Colombia for overall supply 
reduction eforts is conirmed in the 2009 National Drug Control Strategy, in 
which they are the only countries cited in the introduction about international 
eforts to disrupt the drug market (White House, 2009, p.3). Equally, the conti-
nued relevance of these partnerships is highlighted by the 2013 National Drug 
Control Strategy (White House, 2013c, p.54, p.57). From these facts, this article 
concludes that no other international anti-drug operations are more symbolic 
for the war on drugs than the Mexican and Colombian ones.
Structure and arguments
The irst part of this paper settles to, irst, describe the strategy and 
tactics applied by the U.S. war against drugs. Second, it demonstrates that 
from the 1970s until Obama’s term the war on drugs has indeed escalated, 
persisted and ultimately failed. 
In the second part, this article analyses oicial reports, press releases, and 
state oicials’ declarations to ind how governmental actors frame the results of 
the war on drugs and support its continuity. Primarily, this article assesses docu-
ments issued by the Oice of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) during 
Bush Jr.’s and Obama’s presidencies. This period of analysis was chosen, irstly, 
because it is in the light of the new data gathered on Bush’s lawed anti-drug 
strategy that this article tries to ind why failure is not resulting in learning in 
the war on drugs. Secondly, the chosen period of analysis is necessary to esta-
blish whether or not Obama has made signiicant reforms in drug policy. By its 
turn, the choice to analyse documents issued by the ONDCP stems from the 
fact that it is the central anti-drug agency, responsible to advise the President 
on drug-control matters and manage federal drug-control funds and operations. 
Moreover, the agency produces the National Drug Control Strategy, which is 
the main report of the war on drugs, containing an assessment of all anti-drugs 
eforts promoted by the administration (White House, 2012a). In addition, this 
paper analyses documents issued by the U.S. Department of State, considering its 
central role in coordinating international partnerships to curtail drug supplies. 
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Based on the examination of these agencies’ documents, the article argues 
that bureaucracies and presidencies have manipulated data—by ignoring short-
comings in the reduction of drug consumption and availability, while empha-
sising the successful execution of tactical operations to interdict drug ship-
ments, destroy production centres and persecute traickers. 
Hence, the achievements of speciic police and military operations are 
used as evidence of the overall eicacy of the war on drugs, even though these 
tactical methods have not signiicantly helped to attain neither the strategic 
goal of consumption reduction, nor the tactical objectives of reduced availabi-
lity and increased prices. Consequently, oicial reports in which information 
is selectively publicised do not allow decision-makers to see the strategic and 
tactical failures of the war on drugs, which in turn impedes governmental 
learning and change in U.S. drug policy.
1.LOSING THE WAR ON DRUGS 
BY ESCALATING PROHIBITIONIST TACTICS
First of all, the strategy and tactics of the war on drugs have to be presented. 
For the U.S. Government, the actual “consumption” of illicit drugs is the key 
problem. Correspondently, the strategic goal of the war on drugs is to reduce 
the consumption of all illicit drugs8—especially cannabis, cocaine, opiates 
and amphetamine-type substances9 (Mares, 2006, p.6; Miron, 2004,  p.65). 
The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which calls for the creation of a “drug-free 
America”, is one of the oicial documents that express this strategic goal 
(Musto, 1999 [1973], p.278). Equally, this objective can be conirmed in the 
2012 National Drug Control Strategy (White House, 2012b, p.V). 






In order to attain this inal goal, the strategic method that guides the 
war on drugs is “prohibition”: an approach that emphasises judicial punish-
ment for individuals who produce, distribute and consume illicit drugs 
(McBride et al., 2009, p.71; Scherlen, 2012, p.67). The continual commitment 
to prohibition is expressed in the 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, which 
states that “the Administration steadfastly opposes drug legalization”, and that 
“controls and prohibitions help to keep prices higher, and higher prices help 
keep use rates relatively low” (White House, 2011a, p.22-23).
Aiming at reducing drug consumption, the tactical goals of the war against 
drugs are to curtail the supplies of illicit substances, reduce their availability in 
the U.S. market, and consequently raise their prices and make them harder to 
access for consumers. Therefore, the tactical objectives of U.S. drug policy are 
largely “supply-oriented” (Friesendorf, 2007, p.7). 
Aiming at supply-reduction, the main tactical methods promoted by the 
U.S. Government are: 1) the incarceration of producers, traickers, sellers and 
consumers of illicit drugs, 2) the eradication of drug production, 3) the inter-
diction of illicit drug shipments and drug-related inances, and the 4) perse-
cution and extradition of international traickers to be judged in U.S. courts 
(White House, 2013d, p.12-15; Friesendorf, 2007, p.7-9; Jenner, 2011, p.912). 
Thus, the tactical methods of U.S. drug policy are based on coercion through 
law enforcement (Friesendorf, 2007, p.7).
It is necessary to observe that some efort is put on demand reduction and non-
coercive policies—such as health treatment and education10, but police and mili-
tary operations against suppliers receive the highest priority. For iscal year (FY) 
2014, for instance, almost 60% of the federal funds for drug policy are directed to 
domestic law enforcement, interdiction of drug shipments, and programmes to 





In sum, the strategy of the war on drugs is to reduce drug consumption 
through prohibition. To make this strategy attainable, the tactic is mainly to 
deter drug supplies through law enforcement coercion. In this way, the avai-
lability of illicit drugs in the U.S. streets would drop, making them harder to 
access and costlier to purchase, which would contribute to the achievement of 
the strategic goal of consumption reduction.
1.1.PERSISTENCE AND ESCALATION
The previously described anti-drug strategy and tactics started to be 
gradually enforced since Nixon’s presidency (1968-1974), during which the 
federal drug-enforcement budget rose from US$65 million to US$719 million11 
(Baum, 1996, p.75). From Nixon to Obama, federal anti-drug laws evolved from 
allowing simple no-knock searches, to imposing asset seizure without notice, 
mandatory minimum sentences, elimination of probation and parole, increasin-
gly longer imprisonment terms, life sentence and death penalty12. Also, federal 
drug control spending escalated from US$3.4 billion under Nixon, to about 
US$14 billion in Bush Jr.’s FY 2008 budget, and to over US$25 billion in Obama’s 
FY 2014 budget13 (Baum, 1996, p.75; White House, 2013d). Finally, internatio-
nal operations expanded from a few agents stationed abroad, to multi-billion 
partnerships—such as in Mexico and Colombia—to reduce drug supplies14.
The prohibitionist approach to ight drug consumption has persisted after 
the turn of the 20th century. The manner in which Presidents George W. Bush 
and Barak Obama have dealt with medical marijuana producers indicates 








(2006, p.106, p.128, p.130, p.171),  and Pizarro and Gaitán  (2006, p.53);  see Washington’s 
expenses in Colombia and Mexico in CRS (2011, p.8; 2012, p.38).
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cement. Contrary to the expectation that drug enforcement agencies would 
not persecute marijuana producers operating accordingly to state laws, both 
heads of state have supported police raids in these companies (Graves, 2012). 
As Obama (2012) declared, “I never made a commitment that somehow we 
were going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators of 
marijuana—and the reason is, because it’s against federal law”.
Furthermore, although the Obama administration claims to have 
inaugurated a new strategy for drug control, based on a “new, balanced 
approach” that enhances the emphasis in drug prevention and treatment 
(White House, 2010, p.iii), in reality it only slightly increased the funds for 
education and rehabilitation programmes from US$9.9 billion in FY 2008 to 
US$10.7 billion in FY 2014. Meanwhile, the Democrat Government severely 
raised the budget for law enforcement and supply reduction operations from 
US$8.7 billion to US$14.7 in the same period. Therefore, the end of the war on 
drugs and the beginning of a new anti-drug strategy under Obama is a fallacy: 
enshrined in federal law, the prohibitionist approach has not only persisted, 
but also signiicantly escalated during his administration. 
Considering that President Obama is in his second term, the claim that his 
administration has not had enough time to change drug policy does not hold. On 
the contrary, the argument that ending the war on drugs is not a priority is still 
very sound, especially as the Democrat President has no re-election concerns.
1.2.THE WAR ON DRUGS HAS FAILED 
Tactical achievements do not necessarily lead to strategic success; if policy-
makers promote misguided tactical methods—even if they are successfully 
executed—they will not help to make the tactical and strategic goals attainable 
in the long term. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to observe that although 
some supply-oriented tactical operations have achieved a degree of success, 
these policies have not resulted in constricted supplies, curtailed availability, 
increased prices, and reduced consumption of most illicit drugs.
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On the contrary, statistics show that many illegal substances in the U.S. 
have become more afordable. For instance, cocaine and heroin retail prices fell 
approximately 60 and 40%, respectively, from 1990 to 2010 (UNODC, 2012). 
Even though the prices of marijuana have risen, it has not impeded the 
increase of its consumption, which rose by 1.2% from 2007 to 2011 among 
people aged 12 or older (NIDA, 2011).
Equally, operations to eradicate drug production have been inefective. In 
Colombia and Mexico, the combined production of heroin rose approximately 
by 67% from 1995 to 2009. In the same period, the potential manufacture 
of cocaine in Colombia rose about by 51% (U.S. Department of State, 2013; 
UNODC, 2010). Although cocaine production in Colombia appears to have 
dropped since Bush’s administration, Bolivia’s rose more than twofold, and 
Peru’s increased by 17% from 2005 to 201115 (White House, 2011a, p.3; U.S. 
Department of State, 2013, p.26). 
The ineiciency of the war on drugs in curtailing drug supplies can 
also be conirmed in a report from the National Drug Intelligence Center 
of the U.S. Department of Justice, which provides data on the results of the 
Mérida Initiative: “cannabis cultivation in Mexico, combined with high levels 
of domestic cultivation, has resulted in high marijuana availability” in the 
United States, while “increased heroin production in Mexico and increased 
involvement of Mexican TCOs [Transnational Criminal Organisations] in the 
distribution of South American heroin have contributed to wider heroin avai-
lability in many U.S. markets, including some where the drug was previously 
unavailable” (NDIC, 2011, p.3). Consequently, “overall drug availability is 
increasing” in the country (NDIC, 2011, p.2, 3).
Meanwhile, the killing, persecution and extradition of traickers promoted 
by Plan Colombia have not created a safe environment to the people, nor signii-
cantly afected the supply of drugs to the United States. Furthermore, new drug 





taining the low of drug supplies (Friesendorf, 2007, p.20). Hence, as Isacson 
(2008, p.1) airms, “as a strategy against narcotraic, Plan Colombia has been a 
great disappointment”, and “progress will only be sustainable if Plan Colombia, 
and the U.S. aid that maintains it, abandon their essentially military focus”16.
Finally, the global consumption of opiates, cocaine and cannabis increased 
by 34.5, 27 and 8.5% respectively between 1998 and 2008 (GCDP, 2011, p.4). 
Meanwhile, in the United States, the overall demand for drugs is rising, espe-
cially among the youngest; between 2000 and 2010, the consumption of heroin, 
marijuana and methamphetamine in metric tons has increased approximately 
by 9, 90 and 110%, respectively (NDIC, 2011, p.1; White House, 2014, p.5). In 
2012, the country presented the highest consumption rate of opioids registered 
by the UN, and U.S. citizens sustained one the highest consumption rates of 
cocaine, marijuana, amphetamines and ecstasy in the world (UNODC, 2012).
It is necessary to recognise that oicial measures of drug production, traf-
ic and consumption cannot be trusted as completely accurate, given the di -
culty of measuring these factors with precision, and possible political mani-
pulations of data. Nonetheless, they are still meaningful, irst, because they 
are oicial data: policy-makers consider them as true when taking decisions 
on drug policy. Thus, they are perfectly suitable to the objective of this article, 
which is to assess the data used by state oicials to justify the continuity of 
war on drugs. Second, because political manipulation in the data cited above is 
unlikely, since it is a declaration against interest—the U.S. Government and the 
UN themselves have published most of these numbers, rather harming than 
beneiting their political status quo. 
Taking this data as an approximation of the reality of the drug market17, 
there is a clear picture: the war on drugs has fallen miserably short of its stra-
tegic objective and most of its tactical goals. Supply-oriented operations have 






tances—as drug production has risen in many regions, and drug prices have 
fallen in the United States. Equally, domestic law enforcement has shown little 
efect of consumption deterrence: in spite of living in a country dominated by 
one of the most punitive and costly drug enforcement policies in the world, U.S. 
citizens remain among the main sponsors of the global trade of illicit drugs.
2.WINNING THE WAR ON DRUGS IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
In order to evaluate the eiciency of a policy, governmental agencies are 
responsible for issuing reports on the performance of their operations, which 
serve as a feedback to policy-makers. In the case of drug policy, the ONDCP 
is responsible to produce the National Drug Control Strategy, which gives an 
outline of the programmes promoted by the same agency and the presidency 
(White House, 2012a). This report is, therefore, a form of self-evaluation, 
which already casts doubt on its impartiality. 
In the 2013 National Drug Control Strategy, President Obama addresses a 
letter “To the Congress of the United States”, which celebrates, among other 
achievements, that “the rate of current cocaine use in the United States has 
dropped by 50 percent since 2006, and methamphetamine use has declined 
by one-third” (White House, 2013c, p.iii). However, the same text makes 
no mention of the broader picture: the overall consumption and availability 
of illicit drugs had increased in the same period (White House, 2014, p.5; 
NDIC, 2011, p.1; White House, 2011b, p.15-7).
This report exempliies a tendency in oicial documents issued by agencies 
involved in drug policy and the Presidency: they frame the war on drugs as 
an overall success by emphasising narrow-scoped achievements and omitting 
broader failures. Mainly, governmental reports are able to frame drug policy as a 
success by highlighting data on the eicient execution of supply-oriented tactical 
operations, while ignoring information on how these tactics have not resulted in 
the achievement of the tactical and strategic goals of the war on drugs. 
Rodrigo H. G. Ferreira : The war on drugs addiction280
Considering that the U.S. Government is aware of the increases in drug avai-
lability and consumption in the country18, this essay argues that anti-drug agen-
cies deliberately distort the picture of drug policy achievements in order to gather 
support for their own operations. Benson et al. (1995, p.26) had already observed 
the distortion of data in U.S. drug policy in 1995, asserting that police bureau-
cracies were a primary source of the “false or misleading” information used to 
justify the continuity of the war on drugs. Equally, research on theories of policy 
termination and bureaucratic politics has found that governmental agencies tend 
to manipulate data through selective release of information to promote their own 
interests (Scherlen, 2012, p.69; Halperin, 1971, p.88; Benson, 1995, p.25).
The ONDCP’s 2009 National Drug Control Strategy report is emblematic 
in this aspect. Being the last report issued by the W. Bush administration, it 
presents the results of anti-drugs policies promoted during the two mandates 
of the Republican President. In its conclusion, the report states: “the evidence 
produced by the array of data systems we use to measure progress makes it clear 
that our Nation is moving steadily in the right direction, both domestically and 
internationally, in the ight against illegal drugs” (White House, 2009, p.35). 
Equally, in a section directed to the U.S. Congress and signed by President 
Obama, the ONDCP’s 2013 report states: “scientiic research suggests that we 
have made real progress”. Additionally, in its conclusion, the same report shows 
no clue of failure in the war on drugs: “as the Administration enters a second 
term—and the Strategy enters its fourth year—we have reason to be optimistic 
about the future of our eforts to reduce drug use and its consequences in the 
United States” (White House, 2013c, p.iii, 79). 
The ONDCP’s argument that the war on drugs is a success is mainly based 
on the results yielded by three tactical methods: 1) the interdiction of drugs and 
drug related inances, 2) the disruption of drug production, and 3) the persecu-
tion of drug traickers. As the following sections demonstrate, the data gathered 
on the results of these operations is used as evidence to support the argument 




Operations to seize drug shipments circulating inside the U.S. or trying to 
cross their borders are key tactics of drug enforcement eforts. Although most 
illicit drugs have become increasingly available and cheaper to U.S. consumers, 
drug bureaucracies are still able to frame the war on drugs as a success by 
emphasising the larger amounts of drug shipments and inances interdicted by 
law enforcement agents.
In its 2009 report, the ONDCP states: “Through mid-2008, DHE [Domestic 
Highway Enforcement] resulted in the seizure of over $600 million in narco-
tics”; “In FY 2008, seizures in the Western Hemisphere transit zone amounted 
to 290.4 metric tons […]; “global seizures and disruptions of cocaine ship-
ments remain dramatically higher than they were in 2001”; “U.S. Government 
estimates indicate that seizures of cocaine and coca base inside Colombia have 
grown from about 38 metric tons in 2001 to about 93 metric tons as of early 
December 2008.” (White House, 2009, p.24, p.29).
Equally, ONDCP’s reports call attention for the successful interdiction of 
drug money in the inancial system. The 2009 report describes “impressive 
results in the interdiction of drugs and drug-related inances” and celebrates 
the fact that “as a direct result of OFAC’s [Treasury Department’s Oice of 
Foreign Assets Control] designations of the Victor Cazares Salazar inancial 
network in December 2007, Mexican authorities were able to arrest ive indivi-
duals on money laundering charges” (White House, 2009, p.28).
During Obama’s administration, the ONDCP has also called attention 
to the success of interdiction operations. In a 2013 press release, the agency 
reports “signiicant progress achieved at disrupting illegal drug traicking and 
improving operations along the Southwest border” (White House, 2013b). 
The 2013 National Drug Control Strategy highlights that, from 2009 to 2012, 
“DHS [Department of Homeland Security] seized 71 percent more currency, 
39 percent more drugs, and 189 percent more weapons along the Southwest 
border as compared to FY 2006 to 2008” (White House, 2013c, p.42). 
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These tactical achievements would hardly disrupt the world trade of illicit 
drugs, estimated by the UN to be valued in US$400 billion (UNDCP, 1997, cited 
by Reuter and Greenield, 2011, p.160). Indeed, it is true that interdiction tactics 
have apprehended increasingly higher amounts of drug shipments and inances. 
However the results of these operations are too narrow in scope. In order to 
hide the failure of these tactical methods to make strategic and tactical objec-
tives attainable, the ONDCP and the Department of State do not mention the 
increases of overall drug availability and falling prices in the cited documents.
2.2.DISRUPTION OF DRUG PRODUCTION
The tactical achievements of international counterdrug partnerships to 
disrupt drug production and traic also play a central role in framing the war on 
drugs as a success (White House, 2009, p.23). In the 2009 National Drug Control 
Strategy, for instance, the ONDCP states that the “greatest impact” of the war on 
drugs “may be realized through international counterdrug partnerships, such as 
those with the Governments of Colombia and Mexico” (White House, 2009, p.3). 
The irst manner in which the ONCDP seeks to demonstrate the success 
of international counterdrug eforts is by emphasising tactical achievements in 
reducing the production of cocaine, with particular attention to the Colombian 
case. Its 2009 report describes “historic disruptions in the cocaine and 
methamphetamine markets as a result of cumulative progress in Colombia, the 
transit zone, Mexico, and on the Southwest Border”. Equally, during Obama’s 
presidency the U.S. Department of State (2013, p.16-17) highlights “remarkable 
progress against cocaine production and associated violence”, which “have 
strengthened democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Colombia”. 
As evidence of such “historic” achievements, ONDCP’s 2009 report airms 
that “Colombia’s maximum potential production dropped to 535 metric tons 
of pure cocaine in 2007”, and the “maximum potential production of pure 
cocaine has fallen a full 24 percent since its high point in 2001”. These accom-
plishments would have “contributed to the decline in cocaine purity and 
increase in cocaine prices in the United States” (White House, 2009, p.30). 
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Equally, documents issued during Obama’s term celebrate that “cocaine 
production in Colombia has dropped by almost two-thirds since 2001” 
(White House, 2011a, p.3). Moreover, “there has been a 41 percent drop in potential 
pure cocaine production capacity in the Andes since 2001” (White House, 2013a). 
All these achievements would have “contributed to historic reductions in cocaine 
availability within the United States” (White House, 2013c, p.57)
These numbers might give the misleading impression that the war on drugs 
has indeed signiicantly disrupted the illicit drug trade, and reduced drug avai-
lability in the United States since 2001. However, they only do so for being too 
narrow in scope: they focus on some degree of success attained in controlling 
cocaine production in Colombia, while omitting broader failures, such as the 
rise in marijuana, heroin and cocaine productions in Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.
2.3.PERSECUTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS
The second manner in which the U.S. Government justiies the argument 
that international counterdrug programmes are a success is by calling attention 
to the number of drug traickers that have been killed, arrested and extradited, 
especially in Colombia and Mexico.
As the 2009 National Drug Control Strategy states, “years of close coope-
ration with the Government of Colombia have led to a dramatic reduction in 
the threat posed by narcoterrorists operating there”. In addition, “enhanced 
cooperation with the Government of Mexico already has diminished the 
power of drug traickers and will be critical to a long-term solution for secu-
ring our shared border” (White House, 2009, p.3).
As evidence of the eicacy of international counterdrug operations, 
the ONDCP’s 2009 report states: “From 2002 to 2008, a total of 110 CPOTs 
[Consolidated Priority Organisation Targets] have been identiied, of which 
81 percent have been indicted, 53 percent have been arrested, 25 percent 
have been extradited from other countries, and 3 percent have been killed 
either by other gang members or as a result of resisting arrest”; “Colombia has 
extradited 789 narcotics traickers and other criminals to the United States 
for trial since 2002”; and “Colombian Security Forces dealt a signiicant blow 
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to the largest remaining drug traicking organizations in Colombia, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), by killing its number two 
leader, Raul Reyes” (White House, 2009, p.30).
Equally, oicial documents issued during Obama’s term describe signi-
icant progress in international counterdrug eforts: “Mexican bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation with the United States continues to strengthen—in 
2011, some 93 criminals were extradited from Mexico for prosecution in the 
United States, 31 were for narcotics-related ofenses” (U.S. Department of State, 
2012, p.16); and “the numbers of U.S. defendants extradited from Mexico to 
the United States are at their highest levels in history” (White House, 2013b). 
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State (2013, p.17) reported that Mexico 
had achieved “notable success in dismantling and disrupting some of North 
America’s largest and most dangerous drug cartels in 2012, and contributed to 
a signiicant overall decrease in drug-related violence”.
In spite of all the positive results that drug enforcement agencies claim to 
have achieved in Mexico, a report of the U.S. Department of Justice concluded 
that Mexican drug cartels “will continue to dominate wholesale drug traic-
king in the United States for the foreseeable future and will further solidify 
their positions through collaboration with U.S. gangs” (NDIC, 2011, p.3). 
In sum, the ONDCP and the Department of State issue reports that empha-
sise tactical results yielded by anti-drug operations of interdiction, produc-
tion disruption and traickers’ persecution. Following this logic, the greater 
amounts of drug shipments and inances apprehended, the larger scale of drug 
crops and production facilities destroyed, and the increasing number of narco-
traickers killed or arrested would justify the argument that the war on drugs 
is a success, and that Washington should continue to support it.
However, the narrow scope of such data does not account for a broader 
failure: these are tactical operations of supply reduction, and as such, they 
should have made drugs harder to ind and purchase for U.S. consumers. In 
order to camoulage the ultimate ineiciency of these tactics and sustain the 
argument of success, none of the analysed documents present data on how 
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overall drug availability has risen, how most prices have fallen and how overall 
demand has increased in the Country. As a result, some degree of success in 
tactical methods hides the ultimate strategic and tactical failures.
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to expose the importance of research on the 
reasons why policies are inclined towards continuity, and what kinds of forces 
can block policy change. As Bauer (2009, p.2) describes, there is an “overall 
disregard of the analysis of policy termination”, albeit a “rising demand for 
systematic knowledge about policy dismantling and retrenchment”. Thus, 
academia ought to dedicate more attention to the matter—given its policy 
relevance, and the fundamental insights it can provide on how the policy-
making process takes place, and how bureaucratic and political interests can 
deviate it from rational choice.
Oicial reports issued by the ONDCP and the U.S. Department of State 
on the war against drugs are clear examples of how bureaucratic and poli-
tical forces manipulate data in order to support the continuation of a failed 
policy that serves their particular interests. By omitting the fact that drugs 
have become increasingly cheaper and available to U.S. consumers, these 
reports transmit the misleading impressions that current eforts to curtail drug 
supplies and deter drug sale and consumption through law enforcement have 
yielded satisfactory results—limited tactical achievements hide broader strate-
gic and tactical failures.
These inding are irrefutable evidence that, as Benson et al. (1995, p.25) 
point out, bureaucracies make use of selective release of data to manipulate 
political decisions in favour of their own interests. Considering that these 
reports are key sources of information, based on which policy-makers enact 
new drug laws and plan budget allocation, they have certainly misled political 
decisions towards the war on drugs, and consequently blocked organisational 
learning and change in U.S. drug policy.
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It must be recognised, however, that not all U.S. politicians can be expec-
ted to be victims of misinformation from anti-drug agencies. Diferent govern-
mental bureaucracies, such as the Department of Justice19, have published 
data on the shortcomings of drug policy. Also, non-oicial sources, such as 
academic publications, civil organisations and the media have campaigned 
to denounce the failure of the war on drugs. Hence, misinformation alone 
cannot account for the fact that no sitting politician supports drug policy 
change, and that U.S. oicials have avoided scrutiny on alternative policies. 
Certainly, other factors such as bureaucratic barriers, public opinion, elec-
toral constraints, partisan disputes and lobbying also play a role in blocking 
the governmental learning process20. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that 
these variables transcend the scope of this article. They should deinitely be 
explored in a more extensive research. 
Still, the indings of this article suice to demonstrate that the persistent 
dominance of the war on drugs has not been based on impartial data and 
eiciency considerations, but on reports biased towards policy continuation. 
Therefore, there is no excuse for the lack of debate in Washington on alterna-
tive approaches for drug control. More than four decades of law enforcement 
and supply-oriented drug policies have taken the U.S. Government nowhere 
close to a drug-free America. It is time to learn from drug policy failure, and 
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